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Quantum Mechanics as a Principle Theory
Jeffrey Bub∗
Abstract
I show how quantum mechanics, like the theory of relativity, can
be understood as a ‘principle theory’ in Einstein’s sense, and I use
this notion to explore the approach to the problem of interpretation
developed in my book Interpreting the Quantum World.
In an article written for the London Times in 1919, Einstein presented a
remarkably clear and succinct, nontechnical account of the theory of relativ-
ity. He began by drawing a distinction between ‘constructive’ and ‘principle’
theories, and pointed out that the theory of relativity should be understood
as a principle theory ‘in order to properly grasp its nature.’ (I use the trans-
lation in Einstein (1954), which is different from the original translation in
the Times. See Einstein (1954, p. 228).)
Here I apply Einstein’s distinction to the problem of interpreting quantum
mechanics. I show how quantum mechanics, too, can be understood as a
principle theory, and I examine some puzzling features of ‘entangled states’
from this perspective.
1 Principle and Constructive Theories
Most theories in physics are constructive theories. As Einstein puts it (1954,
p. 228), constructive theories attempt ‘to build up a picture of the more com-
plex phenomena out of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from
which they start out.’ His example here is the kinetic theory of gases, which
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‘seeks to reduce mechanical, thermal, and diffusional processes to movements
of molecules—i.e., to build them up out of the hypothesis of molecular mo-
tion.’
By contrast, principle theories ‘employ the analytic, not the synthetic,
method. The elements which form their basis and starting-point are not
hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general charac-
teristics of natural processes, principles that give rise to mathematically for-
mulated criteria which the separate processes or the theoretical representa-
tions of them have to satisfy.’ His example is thermodynamics, which ‘seeks
by analytical means to deduce necessary conditions, which separate events
have to satisfy, from the universally experienced fact that perpetual motion
is impossible.’
This is the picture: A constructive theory, like the kinetic theory of gases,
begins with certain hypothetical elements, the elementary building blocks in
terms of which we attempt to construct models of more complex processes.
So the fundamental theoretical problem for a constructive theory is how
to synthesize complex processes out of the elementary building blocks of
the theory, or how to reduce complex phenomena to the properties of these
elementary building blocks.
The starting point of a principle theory is a set of empirical laws or prin-
ciples, which may conflict with one another from the standpoint of current
theory. The fundamental theoretical problem is the analysis of these princi-
ples, with the aim of arriving at certain necessary conditions or constraints
on events in a theoretical framework that can be seen as underwriting and
reconciling these empirical principles. We ask: what must the world be like—
what are the necessary conditions on events—if certain empirical laws are to
hold.
To show that a theory is a principle theory, we first need to identify the
empirical principles on which it is based. In the case of special relativity,
there are two: the principle of relativity and the principle of the constancy
of the velocity of light. The (special) principle of relativity says that the
Newtonian principle of relativity—the equivalence of inertial observers or
inertial reference frames for all dynamical phenomena—applies to the whole
of physics, including electromagnetic phenomena. Drinking a glass of wine
or watching a movie on a transatlantic flight is no different from doing these
things on earth, except during turbulence when the plane is no longer an
inertial system. The principle of the constancy of the velocity of light says
that the velocity of light in a vacuum is independent of the velocity of the
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observer or the velocity of the light source. As Bondi puts it (1964, 1967),
velocity doesn’t matter, and there is no overtaking of light by light in empty
space.
A consequence of these principles is that there is a difference in the
Doppler effect for sound and light. If Alice and Bob are two inertial ob-
servers, and Alice transmits sound signals to Bob with a constant time inter-
val τt between successive signals, Bob will receive these signals with a time
interval τr between successive signals, where τr depends not only on their
relative velocity, but on the velocity of each relative to the air, the medium
of transmission. In the case of light signals between two inertial observers,
there is no light medium—no ether—corresponding to the medium of trans-
mission for sound. So for light, the ratio of the interval of reception to the
interval of transmission, k = τr/τt, is constant and depends only on the rel-
ative velocity of the transmitter and receiver. It follows immediately that
different inertial observers assign different time intervals to the elapsed time
between two events, as measured by their own clocks, and hence different
distances to spatially separated events. For an account of relativity in terms
of the ‘k-calculus,’ see Bondi (1964, 1967).
The special theory of relativity modifies classical kinematics to provide a
framework that incorporates the principle of relativity and the principle of
the constancy of the velocity of light. Formally, the Euclidean space-time
geometry of Newtonian mechanics is replaced by Minkowskian geometry.
The modification of classical kinematics requires certain changes in classical
dynamics that entail, among other consequences, the equivalence of inertial
mass and energy.
2 From Classical to Quantum Mechanics
As Bohr (1935, 1961, 1966) saw it, quantum mechanics is a ‘rational general-
ization’ of classical mechanics, incorporating the quantum postulate and the
correspondence principle. Quantum mechanics as a principle theory is the
end product of an analysis that begins with these principles.
According to classical electromagnetic theory, an electron in periodic mo-
tion about the nucleus of an atom will emit light in virtue of its acceleration.
A general (possibly non-circular) orbit can be described in terms of a funda-
mental mode and higher harmonics, analogous to the Fourier analysis of the
periodic motion of a string. Just as the frequencies of the higher harmonics
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of a vibrating string are integral multiples of the fundamental frequency, so
the frequencies of the light waves emitted by an orbiting electron are integral
multiples of the fundamental frequency of the electron’s orbital motion. On
the classical theory, waves with the frequencies of the higher harmonics are
emitted simultaneously with waves with the frequency of the fundamental
mode.
What we find empirically is a pattern of frequencies in the light emitted
by a radiating atom that cannot be accounted for by the classical theory.
On Bohr’s theory of the atom, which provides a recipe for calculating the
observed frequencies ν, an atom radiates when an electron jumps between
orbits or ‘stationary states’ associated with discrete or quantized values of
the energy, En, such that:
En − Em = hν
For small values of n, there is no relation between the frequencies of light
emitted by an atom and the frequencies of the harmonics of the electron’s
orbital motion. For large values of n, when the classical orbits are close to-
gether, the frequencies of emitted light are all (approximately) integral mul-
tiples of the fundamental frequency of the n’th orbital motion of the electron,
as in the classical theory, but the higher harmonics are not emitted simul-
taneously with the fundamental mode. Either a wave with the fundamental
frequency of the electron’s orbital motion in that stationary state is emitted in
a transition (corresponding to the transition from one stationary state to an
adjacent stationary state), or a wave with a frequency corresponding to one
of the higher harmonics is emitted (corresponding to a transition between
non-adjacent stationary states). This is the correspondence principle: For
large values of n, the frequencies for the transitions n→ n−1, n→ n−2, . . .
correspond to the frequencies of the fundamental mode and the successively
higher harmonics of the Fourier series for the classical motion of the elec-
tron in the n’th stationary state. A similar correspondence applies to the
intensities and polarizations of the light.
Bohr’s theory incorporates the quantum postulate for the frequencies of
the radiation emitted by an atom and provides a recipe for calculating transi-
tion probabilities between stationary states, but without introducing a mech-
anism for the transitions. Tomonaga (1968, pp. 159–60) discusses what he
calls ‘the viewpoint of common sense,’ that ‘this procedure is to be considered
as merely a convenient recipe for calculating quantum theoretical quantities
such as transition probabilities, since we do not know the cause of a quan-
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tum transition . . . [and when] . . . we arrive at the true theory, the first thing
to be clarified is the mechanism through which only a certain discrete set
of states can occur in nature and then to understand what determines why
some atoms jump from A to B at time tB while others jump from A to B
′
at tB′ , and so on.’ He comments (1968, p. 160; my italics):
It is very natural to anticipate such a future for the quan-
tum theory. However, in applying the correspondence principle
to various problems, a group of physicists, with Bohr as leader,
began to think differently. Namely, they began to realize that
the nature of the discontinuities or of the transitions should be
sought in the correspondence principle itself and that there are no
. . . fundamental laws which have no correspondence to the classi-
cal theory. According to the viewpoint of common sense, a hidden
mechanism is to exist to make the states discontinuous, and there
should be laws of a more fundamental nature which describe the
course of a transition, but this viewpoint should be abandoned.
The correspondence principle so far described is still too vague
in its formulation, but, following Bohr, it is anticipated that the
correct laws of the quantum world should be obtained not by intro-
ducing certain additional laws for the transition mechanism but
instead by a revised form, expressed mathematically in a clear-cut
way, of the correspondence principle itself.
Heisenberg, in developing his matrix version of quantum mechanics in
1925, asked how the kinematics of classical mechanics could be modified
so as to yield Bohr’s frequency condition for the radiation emitted by an
atom when an electron jumps between orbits for small values of n, and the
correspondence principle for large values of n. Beginning with these two
‘empirically discovered’ principles, Heisenberg arrived at a theory of motion
in which the representatives of certain classical dynamical variables do not
commute. This replacement of a commutative algebra of dynamical variables
with a noncommutative algebra turned out to involve replacing the represen-
tation of dynamical properties by the subsets of a set—the phase space of
classical mechanics—with the representation of these properties by the sub-
spaces of a vector space, the Hilbert space of quantum mechanics. That is, it
involves the representation of dynamical properties by a non-Boolean algebra
of a certain sort (the lattice of subspaces of a suitable Hilbert space) instead
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of by a Boolean algebra (the Boolean algebra of subsets of phase space). The
salient structural feature of the transition from classical to quantum mechan-
ics, as von Neumann saw, is the replacement of a set-theoretical or Boolean
structure for the representation of the properties of a mechanical system with
a projective geometry. This structural change introduces a new element, the
angle between subspaces representing properties, that is not present in a set-
theoretic representation. The angles are related to probabilities—in fact, by
Gleason’s theorem, to the only way probabilities can be defined on a non-
Boolean structure of this sort. For details see, for example, the discussion in
the Coda of Bub (1997).
Shortly after the appearance of Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, Schro¨-
dinger developed a wave mechanical version of quantum mechanics from the
idea of wave-particle duality proposed by de Broglie and proved the formal
equivalence of the two theories. (For more details, going beyond the present
sketch, see Mu¨ller (1997).) Physicists tended to adopt the wave theory as a
new way of modelling the micro-world and regarded Heisenberg’s noncommu-
tative mechanics as a formally equivalent version of wave mechanics, without
any special foundational significance. But the significance of the transition
from classical to quantum mechanics is quite different from the perspective
of these two versions of quantum mechanics. Schro¨dinger initially proposed
his theory as a new constructive theory of the processes occurring in atoms,
in terms of standing waves as the fundamental building blocks. By contrast,
Heisenberg’s theory is clearly formulated as a principle theory in Einstein’s
sense: ‘a revised form, expressed mathematically in a clear-cut way, of the
correspondence principle itself.’ In the case of relativity, the modifications
relative to classical mechanics involve geometric structure. For quantum
mechanics, the modifications involve logical structure, in the sense of the
possibility structure of events: the network of constraints on the possible
combinations of properties.
In the following section, I pose the question of how to make sense of the
notion of possibility in a non-Boolean world. I suggest that the Copenhagen
interpretation—at least on Bohr’s version—takes quantum mechanics as a
principle theory, with the ‘Kantian’ twist, based on a transcendental argu-
ment from the primacy of classical concepts, that we only have access to the
non-Boolean quantum world through Boolean perspectives provided by our
classically describably experimental contexts. I shall argue that Booleanity
is not required to preserve much of our commonsense realist intuitions, and
that the significance of interpreting quantum mechanics as a principle the-
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ory is that the possibility structure of events in a quantum universe is not
fixed, as in a classical universe, but changes dynamically (just as the signif-
icance of the transition from classical mechanics to relativistic mechanics is
that the geometry of our universe is not a fixed Euclidean geometry, but a
non-Euclidean geometry that changes dynamically with the distribution of
mass in the universe). In section 4, I show how we can understand quantum
‘entanglement’ as a feature of the dynamical evolution of the possibity struc-
ture of composite systems, and I illustrate this in terms of the phenomenon
of quantum teleportation.
3 Quantum Mechanics as a Principle Theory
of Logical Structure
In a classical world characterized by a Boolean possibility structure, there
are in general many possible truth-value assignments, defined by 2-valued
homomorphisms on the algebra, that assign every proposition a truth value,
either true or false. A classical state can be understood as encoding a cat-
alogue of properties of a classical system, specified by the true propositions
defined by a 2-valued homomorphism. The equations of motion in a classical
theory describe how these properties change over time, that is, how what is
actually the case at a certain time changes to what is actually the case at a
later time.
A quantum world is characterized by a specific sort of non-Boolean possi-
bility structure, represented by the lattice, L, of subspaces of a Hilbert space.
This lattice is also a partial Boolean algebra, that is, it can be represented
as a family of Boolean algebras or lattices pasted together in a certain way
(with maximum and minimum elements identified, and such that, for every
pair of commuting elements, there exists a Boolean algebra in the family
containing both elements). There are no 2-valued maps on L that reduce to
2-valued homomorphisms on each Boolean subalgebra of L, except in the case
of spin-1
2
quantum systems. This is the import of the Kochen and Specker
(1967) ‘no go’ hidden variable theorem. Bell’s (1964) ‘no go’ theorem shows
that for separated spin-1
2
systems, A and B, the quantum statistics for ‘en-
tangled’ quantum states of A and B cannot be recovered from measures over
2-valued maps on LA+B that are 2-valued homomorphisms locally on each
Boolean subalgebra of LA and LB. So the statistics of entangled quantum
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states for spatially separated systems cannot be reduced to measures over
possible catalogues of properties for each system separately, even for spin-1
2
systems.
How, then, do we introduce notions of actuality, possibility, and probabil-
ity on the non-Boolean structure L? The textbook position, following Dirac
and von Neumann, is to take the quantum analogue of the classical state as
represented by a unit vector or ray in Hilbert space, where the catalogue of
properties selected by the ray are those properties represented by subspaces
containing the ray, that is, properties assigned unit probability by the quan-
tum state. The corresponding propositions are taken as true of the system
in the given state. Propositions assigned probability zero by the state are
taken as false, while other propositions are taken as neither true nor false.
This position, given the linearity of the equations of motion, leads immedi-
ately to the measurement problem. (See, for example, Bub (1997, Chapter
1).) To avoid the measurement problem, Dirac and von Neumann proposed
that a measurement in quantum mechanics introduces a discontinuous and
stochastic ‘collapse’ or ‘jump’ of the quantum state onto the subspace corre-
sponding to the property registered in the measurement, with a probability
equal to the probability of the property as specified by the state. This move
requires that measurement processes are somehow distinguished from other
processes in a quantum world, insofar as they involve the suspension of the
linear deterministic quantum dynamics in favour of stochastic ‘collapses’ or
‘quantum jumps.’
Ever since the Solvay conference of October, 1927, most physicists have
payed lip service to the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg
as the ‘orthodox’ interpretation of quantum mechanics, but the Copenhagen
interpretation differs substantially from the interpretation of Dirac and von
Neumann. On Bohr’s version, a quantum ‘phenomenon’ is an individual
process that occurs under conditions defined by a specific, classically de-
scribable experimental arrangement, and an observable can be said to have
a determinate value only in the context of an experiment suitable for mea-
suring the observable. The experimental arrangements suitable for locating
an atomic object in space and time, and for a determination of momentum-
energy values, are mutually exclusive. We can choose to investigate either of
these ‘complementary’ phenomena at the expense of the other, so there is no
unique description of the object in terms of determinate properties.
The Copenhagen interpretation takes quantum mechanics as a principle
theory rather than a constructive theory. But the analysis is qualified by the
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assumption that determinateness is only meaningful in a Boolean context,
defined by the possible values of a single maximal observable (or complete
commuting set of observables) associated with the complete specification
of a classically describable experimental arrangement. In effect, the view is
that we only have access to the non-Boolean quantum world through Boolean
‘windows,’ defined by the behaviour of clasically describable macrosystems in
their roˆle as measuring instruments. The underlying idea–which I referred to
as ‘Kantian’ in the previous section— seems to be that we are Boolean beings,
and that to describe and communicate the results of experiments we need to
specify a particular Boolean perspective, which we do via the specification
of a classically describable macroscopic experimental arrangement.
I propose that what we ought to aim for in interpreting quantum mechan-
ics as a principle theory is an interpretation that preserves as much as we can
of our realist intuitions about possibility, actuality, and probability, subject
to the constraints of the ‘no go’ hidden variable theorems, which limit the
applicability of these intuitions in a quantum world. As it turns out, the
Copenhagen interpretation is one of a well-defined range of interpretations
of this sort.
We know from the ‘no go’ theorems that we cannot generate the prob-
abilities defined by a quantum state, for ranges of values of the observables
of a quantum system, from a measure function on a probability space of el-
ements representing all possible assignments of values to these observables,
if the value assignments are required to satisfy certain locality or structure-
preserving constraints. What this means is that, if we accept the constraints
as reasonable and require that all observables are assigned values, we cannot
interpret the quantum probabilities as measures of ignorance of the actual
unknown values of these observables. In fact, the ‘no go’ theorems show
that there are no consistent value assignments at all to certain well-chosen
finite sets of observables, quite apart from the question of generating the
quantum probabilities as measures over possible value assignments. Note
that the ‘irreducibility’ of quantum probabilities in this sense arises from
certain structural features of Hilbert space, brought out for the first time by
the ‘no go’ theorems. It does not follow from earlier considerations, such as
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which refers only to a reciprocal relation-
ship between the statistical distributions of certain observables for a given
quantum state, and says nothing about hypothetical value assignments to
observables.
We also know that if we consider any quantum state |ψ〉 and any sin-
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gle observable R, the probabilities defined by |ψ〉 for ranges of values of R
can be represented in this way, essentially because the Hilbert space sub-
spaces associated with the ranges of values of a single observable generate a
Boolean algebra (or Boolean lattice). So the possibility of consistent value
assignments, or the representation of quantum probabilities as measures over
such value assignments, must fail somewhere between considering a single ob-
servable and all observables. The relevant question to ask is therefore this:
beginning with an arbitrary quantum state |ψ〉 and the Boolean lattice gen-
erated by a single observable R, how large a set of observables can we add
to R before things ‘go wrong,’ that is, before we run up against the ‘no go’
theorems? More precisely, a 2-valued homomorphism on the Boolean sublat-
tice generated by R is a map that assigns 1’s and 0’s to the elements of the
sublattice in structure-preserving way, and so defines an assignment of values
to the observables associated with the sublattice. What is the maximal lat-
tice extension D(|ψ〉, R) of this Boolean lattice, generated by the subspaces
associated with ranges of values of observables, on which we can represent
the probabilities defined by |ψ〉, for the ranges of values of R and these addi-
tional observables, in terms of a measure over 2-valued homomorphisms on
D(|ψ〉, R)?
This question is answered by a uniqueness theorem first proved by Bub
and Clifton (1996). The theorem provides an answer to the question, on the
further assumption that D(|ψ〉, R) is to be invariant under automorphisms
of the lattice L of all subspaces of Hilbert space that preserve the ray rep-
resenting the state |ψ〉 and the ‘preferred observable’ R. The original proof
(reproduced in Bub (1997)) involved a ‘weak separability’ assumption (intro-
duced to avoid a dimensionality restriction) that required several preliminary
definitions and considerably complicated the formulation of the theorem.
Sheldon Goldstein has pointed out that the proof goes through without this
assumption. For details, see the revised proof by Bub, Clifton, and Gold-
stein following this article. This analysis, in terms of the lattice structure of
finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, has now been generalized by Clifton (1999)
and Halvorson and Clifton (1999) to cover continuous observables and mixed
states in the general framework of C*-algebras.
It turns out that the sublattice D(|ψ〉, R) ⊂ L is unique. It is the sublat-
tice generated by (i)the non-zero projections of |ψ〉 onto the R-eigenspaces,
and (ii) all the rays in the subspace orthogonal to the span of these pro-
jections, by lattice completion. (In the general case, Halvorson and Clifton
(1999) show that uniqueness fails for certain mixed states and certain choices
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of R.) In fact, D(|ψ〉, R) is a generalization of the orthodox (Dirac-von Neu-
mann) sublattice obtained by taking all the subspaces assigned probability 1
or 0 by |ψ〉 as representing determinate properties of the system in the state
|ψ〉, and all other properties as indeterminate (so that the propositions as-
serting that the system possesses these properties in the state |ψ〉 are neither
true nor false or, as a physicist might say, ‘meaningless’ in the state |ψ〉).
From the standpoint of the theorem, the Dirac-von Neumann sublattice
is obtained by choosing R as the identity observable I, but this choice leads
to the measurement problem, as I show in Bub (1997, sections 4.1 and 5.1).
Other choices for R can be associated with various non-orthodox ‘no collapse’
interpretations of quantum mechanics, for example Bohm’s hidden variable
theory and modal interpretations that exploit the biorthogonal decomposi-
tion theorem (cf. Bub (1997, Chapter 6)).
The choice of some preferred observable R other than I requires intro-
ducing a dynamics for the evolution of actual properties or actual values of
observables associated with the ‘determinate sublattice’ D(|ψ〉, R), as this
sublattice evolves over time with the unitary evolution of |ψ〉 as a solution to
Schro¨dinger’s equation of motion. Of course, this dynamics for actual values
will have to mesh with the Schro¨dinger dynamics tracked by |ψ〉. I sketch
such a dynamics in Bub (1997, Chapter 5). It turns out to be a stochas-
tic dynamics that reduces to the deterministic dynamics Bohm introduced
for the actual values of position in configuration space in his 1952 hidden
variable theory, if we take R as continuous position in configuration space.
The issue of a modal dynamics has been investigated in full generality by
Bacciagaluppi and Dickson (1999).
What determines the choice of R if R 6= I? An interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics requires the identification of a suitable preferred observable
that we can take as determinate and in terms of which we can interpret cer-
tain physical processes as measurements yielding distributions of determinate
pointer readings. I propose that such a preferred observable is picked out by
the phenomenon of environmental decoherence. It is this phenomenon that
guarantees the possibility of measurement: dynamical change of a certain
sort that characterizes the transfer of information between systems. Recent
discussions in the literature by Zurek (1991, 1993) and others develop so-
phisticated models of the interaction between the sorts of systems we use as
a measuring instruments and the typical environment in which such instru-
ments are used. The essential feature of these models is that the interaction
that takes place in our world, between a system we are able to use as a mea-
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suring instrument and the environment, selects a particular observable as a
suitable measurement pointer. This is an observable of the measuring instru-
ment that becomes correlated with an observable of the measured system,
for correlations that remain stable over time while the measuring instrument
undergoes an effective ‘monitoring’ by the environment. Such an instru-
ment observable must commute with the instrument-environment interaction
Hamiltonian, and because of the nature of typical instrument-environment
interactions in our universe it appears that a coarse-grained position-type
observable is selected. So the fact that ‘the environment acts, in effect, as
an observer continuously monitoring certain preferred observables which are
selected mainly by the system-environment interaction hamiltonians’ (Zurek,
1993, p. 290) is a contingent dynamical feature of our quantum world that
guarantees the existence of a preferred determinate observable, and hence
the possibility of measurement and the exchange of information.
In terms of the uniqueness theorem, the Copenhagen interpretation can be
understood as involving the claim that we can only describe and communicate
the results of experiments in our non-Boolean quantum world by specifying
a particular Boolean perspective, associated with a classically describable
experimental arrangement that, in effect, selects a particular preferred ob-
servable R as determinate. In the context of the experimental arrangement,
we are entitled to speak of this observable as having a determinate value,
but the values of complementary observables, associated with incompatible
experimental arrangements, are indeterminate, constrained only by the un-
certainty principle. What is right about this view is that description and
communication in a quantum world requires an R-perspective, that is, a de-
terminate sublattice D(|ψ〉, R), but this sublattice need not be a Boolean
algebra. Moreover, this sublattice need not be stipulated in terms of the re-
sources of classical mechanics, and a conventional ‘cut’ between the observed
part of the universe and the observer, but can be generated from processes
internal to quantum mechanics on the basis of the dynamics alone, without
requiring any privileged status for observers.
The significance of interpreting quantum mechanics as a principle theory
can now be understood along the following lines: The move from special
relativity as a principle theory of geometric structure to general relativity
involves the insight that geometry is not only empirical but dynamical. That
is, the transition from classical mechanics to special relativity, as the theo-
retical framework incorporating Einstein’s special principle of relativity and
the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light, requires that geome-
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try cannot be a priori. It makes sense to ask: what is the geometry of the
world? Extending special relativity to general relativity leads to a relativis-
tic theory of gravitation in which the geometry of our universe is not a fixed
Euclidean geometry, as we supposed classically, but rather a non-Euclidean
geometry that changes dynamically as the distribution of mass in the universe
changes. The import of the uniqueness theorem is that, just as the transi-
tion from classical mechanics to relativistic mechanics as a principle theory
of geometric structure leads to the conclusion that geometry is dynamical, so
the transition from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics as a principle
theory of logical or possibility structure leads to the conclusion that possi-
bility is dynamical: the possibility structure of our universe is not a fixed,
Boolean structure, as we supposed classically, but is in fact a non-Boolean
structure that changes dynamically. The unitary Schro¨dinger evolution of
the quantum state in time tracks the evolution of this possibility structure
as a dynamically changing sublattice D(|ψ〉, R) in the lattice of all subspaces
of Hilbert space. So the Schro¨dinger time-dependent equation characterizes
the temporal evolution of what is possible, not what is actual at time t.
In a classical world, change is described by the evolution over time of
what is actual, where what is actually the case at time t is selected by a
2-valued homomorphism—the classical state—as a temporally evolving sub-
structure against the background of a fixed Boolean lattice of possibilities.
In a quantum world, what is actually the case at time t is selected by a
2-valued homomorphism as a temporally evolving substructure on a dynam-
ically changing background of possibilities. So in a quantum world there is
a dual dynamics: the Schro¨dinger dynamics for the evolution of possibility,
and a dynamics for how what is actually the case changes with time, which
must mesh with the evolving possibility structure and turns out to be a gen-
eralization of Bohmian dynamics. I shall refer to the state in the sense of a
catalogue of properties selected by a 2-valued homomorphism on D(|ψ〉, R)
as the ‘property state’ to distinguish this notion of state from the quantum
state |ψ〉.
4 Entanglement
In terms of the view outlined in the previous section, we can now understand
‘entanglement’—what Schro¨dinger (1935, p. 555) called ‘the characteristic
trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from
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classical lines of thought’—as arising from the dynamical evolution of the
possibility structure of composite systems, through the tensor product rep-
resentation of their quantum states. (Note that entangled states do not
occur in a classical wave theory, where the states of composite systems are
Cartesian products of the subsystem states.)
I begin by considering the significance of Bohr’s reply to the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen argument (1935) from this standpoint, applied to the exam-
ple of two separated spin-1
2
systems in the singlet spin state. The essential
point to understand here is the peculiar quantum mechanical nonlocality, or
better, nonseparability (in Bohr’s terminology, ‘wholeness’) of the separated
systems in the ‘entangled’ singlet state. I show how this phenomenon arises
as a feature of the dynamical evolution of the possibility structure, from the
perspective of the determinate sublattice selected by a coarse-grained pre-
ferred position observable, following the discussion in the previous section
concerning the selection of the preferred observable R. I go on to consider
the recent application of entangled states to quantum teleportation, in which
a shared entangled state between two parties, Alice and Bob, allows the in-
stantaneous transfer of a quantum state from Alice to Bob, with no violation
of relativistic principles. (See Lo, Popescu, and Spiller (1998) for an ac-
count and references to the original experiments.) The puzzle here is how
the information gets from Alice to Bob. I show how this puzzle is resolved
in a similar way by considering the effect of Alice’s operations (as unitary
transformations) on the determinate sublattice.
Consider two separated spin-1
2
particles, S1 and S2, in the singlet spin
state. To bring out the conceptual issue clearly suppose, for simplicity, that
the preferred observable R is a discrete, coarse-grained position observable
with eigenvalues corresponding to the pairs of values of R1 and R2, the two
discrete position observables of S1 and S2. Then the quantum state of S1+S2
can be represented schematically as:
|Ψ0〉 = ( 1√
2
|+〉1|−〉2 − 1√
2
|−〉1|+〉2)|r0〉1|r0〉2, (1)
where |+〉 and |−〉 denote spin component eigenstates in the z-direction,
and |r0〉1 and |r0〉2 represent the initial ‘zero’ positions of the two particles.
Now suppose that a unitary transformation is applied at S1 that entangles
eigenstates of R1 with spin component eigenstates in the z-direction, corre-
sponding to what is sometimes called a ‘premeasurement’ (without ‘collapse’)
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of z-spin on particle S1. This yields the transition:
|Ψ0〉 U⊗I−→ |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
|+〉1|−〉2|r+〉1|r0〉2 − 1√
2
|−〉1|+〉2)|r−〉1|r0〉2, (2)
where U is defined on the tensor product of the spin Hilbert space of S1 and
the position Hilbert space of S1, and I is the identity on the corresponding
product space of S2.
The eigenspaces of the preferred observable R are the subspaces in the
tensor product Hilbert space of S1 + S2 that correspond to particular values
for R1 and R2. For simplicity, suppose that R1 and R2 can each take one
of three possible values, −, 0 , or +, so that there are nine eigenspaces
for R. While D(|Ψ0〉, R) does not contain z-spin properties for S1 or S2
(because the non-zero projections of |Ψ0〉 onto the R-eigenspaces yield only
the property corresponding to the superposition 1√
2
|+〉1|−〉2 − 1√2 |−〉1|+〉2),
the sublattice D(|Ψ〉, R) does (because the non-zero projections of |Ψ〉 onto
the R-eigenspaces yield the properties corresponding to z-spin product states
|+〉1|−〉2 and |−〉1|+〉2). So a unitary transformation at S1, which applies
also to the composite entangled system S1 + S2, can make a property at S2
determinate that was not determinate before, via the dynamical evolution
of possibilities open to the system S1 + S2. There is no violation of the
‘no signalling’ requirement of special relativity, because the physical process
at S1 does not change any determinate or actual spin-component value of
S2: the determinate sublattice D(|Ψ0〉, R) does not contain spin-component
properties of S2 (or of S1). Rather, the unitary transformation at S1 results
in the dynamical evolution of the determinate sublattice to a determinate
sublattice containing spin-component properties. As Bohr (1935, p. 699)
put it in his reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen:
Of course there is in a case like that just considered no question of
a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation during
the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at this
stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very
conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding
the future behaviour of the system.
If we accept that a quantum world differs from a classical world in just
this way—that a reversible local unitary transformation can change what
is possible, but not what is actually the case, nonlocally— then we can
understand how the phenomenon of quantum teleportation is possible.
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In a teleportation protocol, Alice and Bob initially share a singlet state:
(
1√
2
|+〉A|−〉B − 1√
2
|−〉A|+〉B)|r0〉A|r0〉B, (3)
where |r0〉A and |r0〉B represent the initial ‘zero’ positions of Alice’s particle
A and Bob’s particle B. Alice is required to teleport a particle C in an
arbitrary quantum state
|ψ〉C = c+|+〉C + c−|−〉C (4)
to Bob. In effect, she is required to ‘fax’ information to Bob that will enable
him to reconstruct the quantum state of C from the raw material he has on
hand: his half of the shared entangled state. Remarkably, Alice can do this
by transferring just two bits of classical information to Bob, vastly less than
the amount of information required to fully specify the quantum state of C.
The puzzle is: how does the rest of the information get from Alice to Bob?
(See, for example, Jozsa’s discussion in Lo, Popescu, and Spiller (1998).)
The initial quantum state of the system A+B + C is:
|Φ0〉 = |ψ〉C( 1√
2
|+〉A|−〉B − 1√
2
|−〉A|+〉B)|r0〉A|r0〉B (5)
This can be expressed as:
|Φ0〉 = 1
2
|1〉AC(c+|+〉B + c−|−〉B)|r0〉A|r0〉B
+
1
2
|2〉AC(−c+|+〉B + c−|−〉B)|r0〉A|r0〉B
+
1
2
|3〉AC(c−|+〉B + c+|−〉B)|r0〉A|r0〉B
+
1
2
|4〉AC(−c−|+〉B + c+|−〉B)|r0〉A|r0〉B, (6)
where |1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉 are the Bell states:
|1〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉|−〉 − |−〉|+〉) (7)
|2〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉|−〉+ |−〉|+〉) (8)
|3〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉|+〉 − |−〉|−〉) (9)
|4〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉|+〉+ |−〉|−〉) (10)
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The Bell states form an orthonormal basis in the Hilbert space HAC .
Suppose Alice applies a unitary transformation in HAC that entangles the
position of A with the Bell states. That is, she applies a unitary transfor-
mation that corresponds to a premeasurement (with the position of A as
‘pointer’) of an observable Q of A+C that has the Bell states as eigenstates.
This results in the transition:
|Φ0〉 → |Φ〉 = 1
2
|1〉AC |r1〉A(−c+|+〉B − c−|−〉B)|r0〉B
+
1
2
|2〉AC|r2〉A(−c+|+〉B + c−|−〉B)|r0〉B
+
1
2
|3〉AC|r3〉A(c−|+〉B + c+|−〉B)|r0〉B
+
1
2
|4〉AC|r4〉A(−c−|+〉B + c+|−〉B)|r0〉B (11)
Consider now the determinate sublattice D(|Φ〉, R). To simplify the anal-
ysis here, suppose that each of four possible pointer positions, that is, A-
positions |r1〉A, · · · , |r4〉A, is associated with a 2-valued homomorphism on
the sublattice, that is, a distinct property state: an assignment of truth val-
ues to the propositions in the sublattice that selects a catalogue of the actual
properties of the system A+B+C. When Alice ascertains the position of the
pointer, she obtains two bits of information about the position (which, as the
result of the premeasurement unitary transformation, has one of four possi-
ble positions, each with equal probability), and hence two bits of information
about the correlated property state.
From these two bits of information (conveyed to Bob by Alice via a clas-
sical channel), Bob can select one of four possible unitary transformations
on the Hilbert space HB, with the properties:
− c+|+〉B − c−|−〉B
UB(1)→ |ψ〉B (12)
−c+|+〉B + c−|−〉B
UB(2)→ |ψ〉B (13)
c−|+〉B + c+|−〉B
UB(3)→ |ψ〉B (14)
−c−|+〉B + c+|−〉B
UB(4)→ |ψ〉B (15)
where |ψ〉B is given by (4). Since |Φ〉 is a product state on HAC ⊗ HB,
the effect of applying the unitary transformation UB(i), i = 1, . . . , 4, on HB,
which is equivalent to Ui = IAC ⊗ UB(i) on HAC ⊗ HB, is to transform
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|Φ〉 to U(i)|Φ〉 = |Φi〉. The property state on D(|Φi〉, R), for the value of
i corresponding to the actual pointer position, is generated by a 2-valued
homomorphism that assigns 1 to the component
|i〉AC |ri〉A|ψ〉B|r0〉B
of |Φi〉. That is, the effect of the transformation is to instantiate the property
represented by the projection operator |ψ〉〈ψ| on HB. So Bob requires only
two bits of information to reconstruct the property state on A+B +C that
contains the B-property represented by the 1-dimensional subspace spanned
by |ψ〉B in HB. The puzzle about how this information suffices for Bob to
reconstruct the teleported state is resolved once we see that Alice’s local
unitary transformation alters the global determinate sublattice to one in
which there are four property states, with equal probability, related in known
ways to the required property state.
5 Decoherence
On the Dirac-von Neumann interpretation, Alice’s measurement is supposed
to ‘collapse’ the (global) state onto one of the branches in the superposition
|Φ〉. But this collapse is surely an unacceptably ad hoc modification of the
quantum dynamics, introduced solely to pick out the branch of the super-
position that accords with the properties that actually obtain, according to
the Dirac-von Neumann prescription. And there is no teleportation on this
interpretation without the collapse.
A currently fashionable view is to appeal to environmental decoherence.
If the Hamiltonian characterizing the interaction with the environment com-
mutes with R, each of the pointer states |ri〉, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, in |Φ〉, becomes
coupled with a state of the environment, where these environmental states
very rapidly approach orthogonality. To exhibit interference between the
different branches of the superposition, one would have to perform an appro-
priate experiment on the system together with the environment, which is for
all practical purposes impossible. On this basis, it is argued that because the
different branches of the superposition effectively no longer interfere after
the entanglement of the pointer position with the eigenstates of the mea-
sured observable Q, we are entitled to take one of the branches as the actual
branch. But nothing in the Dirac-von Neumann interpretation sanctions this
move—nothing distinguishes one of the branches as privileged in this way.
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Moreover, it follows from the uniqueness theorem that it is inconsistent to
take any of the properties associated with one of the branches of the su-
perposition as actual on the basis of the Dirac-von Neumann interpretation,
together with the other properties that are taken as actual on the basis of
this interpretation (that is, the properties assigned unit probability by the
total quantum state). A further move is to take all the branches as equally
‘actual’ in some sense, but the notion of actuality, as distinct from possibility,
then becomes empty.
On the view I have sketched above, decoherence means that the temporal
evolution of the property state will, for all practical purposes, be independent
of those parts of the total quantum state |Φ〉 inHA+B+C+E that are effectively
orthogonal to the component corresponding to the actual pointer position.
For a discussion, see Bub (1997, section 5.4). So when Alice obtains her two
bits of information about the pointer position and conveys this information to
Bob, Bob knows that the quantum state of B is effectively one of four possible
states, a factor state of the component of the total quantum state of the
composite system A+B+C+E that corresponds to Alice’s pointer position.
There is an effective collapse of the state as a result of the interaction of
the pointer system with the environment, and it is because of this effective
collapse that one can say that, for all practical purposes, the quantum state of
C has been transferred to B: the evolution of the property state of B will be
determined, effectively, by this quantum state. (Note that this decoherence
argument is not available on the Dirac-von Neumann version of the orthodox
interpretation.)
The decoherence account of measurement is supposed to validate the pro-
jection postulate or the collapse of the quantum state in a measurement pro-
cess. Now, a measurement interaction between a system S and a measuring
instrument M , followed by a virtually instantaneous interaction between M
and the environment E (via a Hamiltonian that commutes with the pointer
observable), yields a quantum state for S + M + E that, in virtue of the
nature of the interaction between M and E, takes a certain form. Express-
ing the state as a density operator and tracing over HE , yields a reduced
density matrix WS+M for S +M that is effectively diagonal in the pointer
basis: the off-diagonal elements decay almost instantaneously to zero. But
the fact that the density operatorWS+M , obtained by ‘ignoring’ or ‘averaging
over’ the environment takes the form of a mixture with respect to properties
associated with the pointer basis not only fails to account for the occurrence
of just one of these events, but is actually inconsistent with such an occur-
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rence. If we consider the origin of the mixture, and the Dirac-von Neumann
rule for relating the quantum state to a property state, the property state
defined by the quantum state |Φ〉 of S +M + E selects a determinate sub-
lattice D(|Φ〉, I) in HS+M+E. This determinate sublattice is maximal by the
uniqueness theorem, and so we cannot add to it properties that are determi-
nate, via the Dirac-von Neumann rule, on the basis of one of the states in the
mixture. One can, in fact, show quite easily, independently of the theorem,
that if we add any proposition, represented by a subspace in HS+M+E, to
the determinate sublattice D(|Φ〉, I), then we have to add the propositions
represented by every subspace in HS+M+E to D(|Φ〉, I), and this would, of
course, generate a Kochen-Specker contradiction.
The appeal of the decoherence solution to the measurement problem de-
rives from the belief that we can interpret the reduced density operatorWS+M
as representing the occurrence of a particular event—the event associated
with a particular pointer reading and the instantiation of the correlated
properties of S—with the terms along the diagonal of the density matrix
in the position basis representing a measure of our ignorance as to the actual
event. The suggestion is that the procedure of tracing over the environment
is analogous to the procedure of deriving a probability of 1
2
for ‘heads’ and 1
2
for ‘tails’ in a coin toss experiment by averaging over the uncontrolled and
unmeasured degrees of freedom of the environment of the coin. Zurek (1996,
p. 39), for example, refers to the procedure by which one derives the reduced
density operator as ‘ignoring (tracing over) the uncontrolled (and unmea-
sured) degrees of freedom of the environment.’ But the two procedures are
not at all analogous. When we ‘ignore’ the environment to claim that the
probability of getting ‘heads’ on a particular toss of the coin is 1
2
, we can
also claim that we do in fact get either ‘heads’ or ‘tails’ on each particu-
lar toss, and whether we get ‘heads’ or ‘tails’ on a particular toss depends
on the precise values of certain environmental parameters, which we do not
attempt to control or measure. But in the quantum mechanical case, we
cannot claim that taking full account of the environment on each particular
occasion would fix the value of the pointer as one particular value. Taking
full account of the environment will, of course, give us back the pure state
of S +M + E from which the mixture WS+M was derived. And this state
is inconsistent with the occurrence of events associated with definite pointer
readings on the orthodox interpretation.
20
6 Instrumentalism
In the previous sections, I argued for an interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics as a principle theory, and I endorsed the Copenhagen interpretation as
implicitly taking a similar view. Of course, the Copenhagen interpretation
is more commonly given an instrumentalist reading. Here I want to take is-
sue with instrumentalist solutions to the interpretative problems of quantum
mechanics.
Many physicists, for example, Peres (1980, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1998) and
van Kampen (1988), reject the Dirac-von Neumann version of the orthodox
interpretation and profess to champion the Copenhagen interpretation in
Bohr’s formulation. Generally, Bohr’s sometimes obscure pronouncements
are given an instrumentalist slant. In a review of my book, Peres remarks
(1998, pp. 612–613):
The tacit assumption made by Bub (as well as by many authors
who tried to come to grips with [the interpretation] problem) is
that the wave function is a genuine physical entity, not just an
intellectual tool invented for the purpose of computing probabili-
ties. . . . In the theoretical laboratory, wave functions are routinely
employed by physicists as mathematical tools, which are useful
for predicting probabilities for the various possible outcomes of a
measurement process.
Both Peres and van Kampen develop similar accounts of measurement
in quantum mechanics, which they see as consistent with Bohr’s position.
A measurement apparatus is treated as a macroscopic system with many
degrees of freedom, prepared in a certain macrostate. As van Kampen em-
phasizes (1988, p. 101):
When a macroscopic pointer indicates a macroscopic point on
a dial the number of microscopic eigenstates involved has been
estimated by Bohm (1951, Chapter 4) to be 1050. When the ob-
server shines in light in order to read the position of the pointer,
the photons do perturb the ψ of the pointer, but the perturbation
does not affect the macrostate. The vector ψ is moved around
a bit in these 1050 dimensions but its components outside the
subspace remain negligible. That is the reason why macroscopic
observations can be recorded objectively, independently of the
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observations and the observer, and may therefore be the object
of scientific study. The lilliputian measurements of Heisenberg
(1949, Chapter II). and von Neumann do not apply to experi-
ments with macroscopic systems.
The ‘lilliputian measurements of Heisenberg and von Neumann’ involve
unitary transformations of the quantum state. But then, as Peres notes
(1986, p. 691), ‘nothing happens’:
The two electrons in the ground state of the helium atom are
correlated, but no one would say that each electron ‘measures’
its partner. In general, if we have a piece of hardware which
can be used as a measuring apparatus, we must choose one of
the following alternatives: Either let it work in a noisy environ-
ment (including its own internal ‘irrelevant’ degrees of freedom)
or let it be perfectly prepared and isolated, and described by
the Schro¨dinger equation. In the latter case, that piece of hard-
ware loses its status of ‘measuring apparatus.’ This is just a
matter of having consistent definitions: A measuring apparatus
must have macroscopically distinguishable states, and the word
‘macroscopic’ has just been defined as ‘incapable of being isolated
from the environment.’
Yet anyone is free to imagine a perfect world, completely and
exhaustively described . . . . In that world, there is neither noise
nor irreversibility. . . . In that perfect world, nothing happens and,
in particular, there are no measurements.
For Peres (1986, p. 691), the collapse of the quantum state on measure-
ment ‘is not a physical process, but simply the acquisition of fresh knowledge
about a physical system. It is a change of our description, whereby we return
from a Gibbs ensemble to a single object.’
Knowledge of what? A procedure that is quite unobjectionable classically,
where there is a fact of the matter about which we are initially ignorant and
come to know via a measurement, is quite incomprehensible in a purely
quantum description, where ‘nothing happens.’ The view is tenable only if
we smuggle in some notion of determinateness or actuality. But what is the
principle involved here? We can’t simply assert, by fiat, that macrostates
are determinate, that something or other happens at the macrolevel but not
at the microlevel. That would be tantamount to saying that whether or
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not something happens, or whether or not something is actually the case,
depends on whether or not we ignore certain aspects of the world as ‘noise.’
So whether or not an event takes place would not be an objective feature
of the world but would depend entirely on features of our description of
phenomena—features that have to do with our limited technological and
mathematical abilities, and our interests.
Van Kampen sees the collapse a little differently. He considers a mea-
suring apparatus that can detect whether an electron has passed through a
region U in space. The apparatus consists of an atom in an excited state,
together with an electromagnetic field. The electron distorts the state al-
lowing the emission of a photon, which can be detected by catching it on a
photographic plate. Van Kampen shows that there is a term in the quantum
state of the total system representing a wave emanating from the region U ,
associated with the triggering of the measurement apparatus by the electron.
He concludes (1988, p. 106):
This is the collapse of the wave function: when the apparatus has
observed the electron to be in U the electron wave function is no
longer the initial φ but is replaced by ψk. Thus the collapse is
not an additional postulate and has nothing to do with a change
of my knowledge or some such anthropomorphic consideration.
But what does it mean for the apparatus to ‘observe the electron to be
in U ’? In a purely quantum description there is nothing that selects this
apparatus event as privileged. And why should an ‘observation’ in this sense
require the quantum state to be replaced by a component of the total state,
unless the Dirac-von Neumann interpretation is invoked implicitly?
Of course, a purely instrumental interpretation of quantum mechanics—
or any theory—is a consistent view. But then, as Einstein remarked in a
letter to Schro¨dinger (see Przibram (1967, p. 39):
If that were so then physics could only claim the interest of shop-
keepers and engineers; the whole thing would be a wretched bun-
gle.
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